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Abstract: Much empirical international trade research requires a careful analysis of bilateral
trade patterns. In this paper we examine a commonly used technique called the gravity
equation. Though the use of the gravity equation on aggregate data is well-grounded in
monopolistic competition trade theory, we show that central predictions necessary for its
derivation can be rejected with simple tests on disaggregated data. We also show why
the aggregate equation fits data well, and demonstrate when it is useful for testing theory,
estimating correlates of trade volumes, and norming bilateral trade flows.
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Why do national borders and geographic distance still pose such impressive bar-
riers to international transactions? What are the welfare effects of customs unions? Does
currency volatility reduce the gains from trade? What economic models best describe
trade patterns? These, and related questions, have recently been at the forefront of empir-
ical research in international trade.1 Each requires the careful analysis of bilateral trade
patterns, yet we lack a standard set of tools for such a task.
Neoclassical trade theory contains rich predictions regarding the factor content of
trade, but has little to say about the volume of trade, and is virtually mute with respect
to trade's bilateral distribution. This silence has not, however, prevented empiricists from
studying bilateral trade flows using a model commonly referred to as the gravity equation.2
Though originally considered an ad hoc specification, and frequently dismissed for that
reason, subsequent developments in trade theory have provided a compelling justification
for its use. Specifically, the inclusion of monopolistic competition into the canon of trade
models provides a sound framework for linking empirical work on bilateral trade to theory.
Nevertheless, the gravity model of international trade remains an enigma. Many
economists remain skeptical about its use despite a number of long-standing papers ex-
ploring its theoretical foundations. Meanwhile, gravity estimates abound in the empirical
1 See McCallum (1995), and Wei (1996) for analysis of borders and distance as impediments to trade; Krugman
(1991), Haveman (1996), and others for the debate on regionalism; Thursby and Thursby (1985), Frankel, et al.
for currency volatility, Helpman (1987), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) and Deardorff (1997) on testing trade
theories.
2 See Savage and Deutsch (1960), Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) for early examples.
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trade literature, with literally scores of studies employing gravity models over the last three
decades, and even greater use of late.3 We are, however, left with a quandary: is it faith
in these models or skepticism about them that is misplaced?
Our purpose here is not to expand an already voluminous literature on the deter-
minants of bilateral trade volumes. Rather, we intend to look more deeply at the empirical
relationship captured by gravity models in order to understand two things. One, why does
the gravity model fit the data so well? Two, what can we learn about trade by examining
bilateral trade flows? In particular, we focus our analysis around the three common uses of
gravity models to learn what bilateral trade flows tell us about partial correlates of trade,
"norming" trade flows, and testing trade theories.
To answer this, we provide two exercises that examine the robustness of gravity
models and their use. In the first, we look beyond the predictions of specific economic
models to investigate the general properties of bilateral matrices. Once we understand
the patterns that must result from a bilateral matrix, we will be better equipped to un-
derstand what econometric estimates of these patterns means. In the second, we turn to
disaggregated data to demonstrate the strengths and shortcomings of the aggregate gravity
equation and to show what we can learn from bilateral trade. Sectoral data allows us to
explore why trade is missing relative to a simple bilateral trade baseline, when aggregate
data can be used to norm trade flows, and how we can separate several margins that ulti-
mately affect trade volume. We conclude that the gravity equation has proved a useful if
crude technique for sorting out bilateral trade patterns, but that the time for more careful
techniques is at hand.
3 All of the empirical work cited in the introductory paragraph employs some form of gravity estimate.
3II. The Gravity Model: theoretical foundations
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The simple form of the gravity model relates aggregate bilateral imports to the size




where Mij is i's total imports from j, Yi and Yj are the countries' GDPs, and Dij is the
distance from i to j. A typical estimate4 is given by
lnMij =0.87lnYi + 1.05lnYj - 1.32lnDij
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
obs = 7402 R 2 = 0.66
(2)
Early empirical work employing gravity equations predates careful theoretical mo-
tivation. Instead of a model, we are offered intuition: bilateral trade volume is a function
of each country's overall potential to trade, and the bilateral costs that resist trade and
allocate it over partners. Thus, large countries have more production to trade, and pairs
separated by distance or high tariff walls will see little of that potenti~l. This same intu-
ition is present in all the subsequent models used to explicitly derive the gravity equation.
The contribution in the careful work is to show why bilateral flows depend on trade poten-
tial and resistance, and to provide precise predictions about the trade volume of specific
pairs.
The theoretical justification for trade potential is easiest to convey in a model first
developed by Anderson (1979). The production of goods is completely specialized so that
every country is the sole supplier of the goods that it produces. Preferences are identical
across countries and there is no trade resistance in the form of tariff barriers or transport
costs. With identical preferences each country i will consume an amount of every good k
equal to i's share in world income,
4 This sample represents all bilateral country pairings with positive trade observations in 1992 from the Statistics
Canada World Trade Database.
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where Si = Yi/Yworld, and y k is world production of k. With complete specialization, world
output of k is produced entirely in country j, yk = Yjk. Were many exporters to produce
k, the model would exhibit a bilateral indeterminacy - while i's multilateral imports of k
would be known, the distribution of those imports over multiple partners would not. This
indeterminacy is a hallmark of neoclassical trade models with homogeneous goods. Here,
in contrast, the consumption vector directly pins down the pattern of bilateral imports as
M k - s·yk - s·ykij - t - 1 j'
Country i will demand a similar fraction of all the goods produced in country j. Summing
over all sectors we arrive at the simple gravity model:
M .. _ YiYjIJ - •Yw (3)
(4)
Here, trade potential consists of all of national product. A simple variant is to allow
fractions bi and bj of consumption and production to be non-traded. Bilateral imports are
then
M .. _ bibjYiYj
IJ - l:l bll'l .
Trade potential is now given by the size of the traded goods sectors. Determining the
appropriate trade potential between two partners is then key to providing a no-resistance
or frictionless baseline for trade.
To understand the role of trade resistance requires more structure. Most empirical
work on bilateral trade patterns employs some variant on the monopolistic competition
model to motivate estimates. This model is very familiar in the literature, so details of the
derivation are left to the appendix. Consumers purchase varieties of a single differentiated
good according to Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, and transport costs, t, are of iceberg form. 5
Alternatively, think of these costs as ad-valorem tariffs. Deriving country i's de-
mand for a single variety at location j, and adding over all varieties from j gives the
5 Many studies appeal to the tij term as a kind of catch-all for any variable that affects trade costs: distance,
common borders and language, exchange rate variability, customs unions, and so on. This is not strictly
appropriate unless the trade cost is of iceberg form. Fixed costs like market adaptation can result in markedly
different predictions about the pattern of trade and welfare gains from it. See Romer (1994).
5(lan::ed) volume of bilateral imports





Setting relative prices equal to one, and allowing tij =1 (no trade costs), we arrive
back at the frictionless model (3). Again, trade potential is given by national products
and trade resistance takes the form of relative prices, inclusive of trade costs. When c.iJ.
prices are high for j's varieties relative to the index, i buys less of j's goods.
These models make it clear that it is possible to derive the gravity equation from
sensible structural models. We know the one-sector monopolistic competition model fits the
data, in the sense that estimation yields highly significant coefficients and good explanatory
power. The relevant question becomes: does it fit the data uniquely, and if not, do
competing theories have different implications for standard empirical exercises that employ
the gravity equation?
III. General Properties: Bilateral Matrices
How general is the gravity model? Empirically, the model appears to be extremely
general, in the sense that data samples incorporating widely varying countries and time
periods fit the model well. Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) point out that a variant of the
gravity model fits well even for sets of developing countries that have virtually no intra-
industry trade with each other. This has troubling implications for explanations that
rely on monopolistic competition theory. In that model, the existence of differentiated
goods results in both intra-industry trade and the gravity equation. One explanation may
be that complete specialization characterizes production; while gravity predictions result,
there will be no intra-industry trade because every industry is found in only one location.6
6 However, the two models may provide a distinction without a difference. Both rely on complete specialization
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Another explanation is provided by Deardorff (1997) who shows that the frictionless
gravity equation can be derived from a standard neoclassical trade model with homoge-
neous goods and incomplete specialization. The model relies on the bilateral indeterminacy
that results when there are multiple buyers and sellers of a commodity at the same price.
In such situations, the actual trading pattern might look like a gravity equation if exporters
sell to, and importers buy from, a world pool of a commodity. With random draws from
a world pool, the chance of a given bilateral pair matching will be a function of the size
of their draws (i.e., their economic size). If trade is generated probabilistically by way of
a large number of very small draws, the equilibrium will converge to equation (3).7
Deardorff's model widens the set of models consistent with the gravity equation,
but because of the very strong structure, it does not widen the set much. Nevertheless,
this theory points us in an interesting direction. One can interpret Deardorff's model as
being an exact statement of the bilateral trade of every pair. Alternatively, one can think
of it as a statement of patterns that should hold, on average, when considering all pairs.
The difference is not merely semantic. In the former case, we retain testable implications
of theory, as well as a useful norm against which to benchmark trade. In the latter case,
we may lose any ability to select models, and a bilateral norm becomes meaningless.
To make this clear, we provide several propositions about the general properties
of bilateral matrices. Consider a matrix of all world production and consumption flows,
aggregated over sectors, for all n countries in the world. Assume balanced trade so that each
country's consumption (row total) and production (column total) are equal in each period.
Include in this matrix consumption of home goods, Gii, where this value is defined as
(Yi - 2:j ¢i Mij ).8 Note that any bilateral allocation must satisfy 2n adding up constraints,
in production so that each good is produced in only one country. Whether we define products as "varieties" of
the same good, or distinct goods, and whether we therefore measure their exchange as intra-industry trade may
be of little consequence. What is essential in both cases is that every product is produced in only one place,
and every country demands every product.
7 A similar argument is provided by Savage and Deutsch (1960), and Leamer and Stern (1970). However, these
descriptions do not follow from careful models, and therefore do not make obvious the extremely strong structure
that Deardorff requires for his results.
8 Later, we generalize by excluding home goods. Also, we ignore intermediate inputs so that the sum of goods
flows equals domestic value added, not domestic gross output. This will not substantively affect any of the
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one for each row and column, given by I:j Mij =Yi, 'Ei Mij = lj. That is, when adding
country i's purchases over all sources, you must get back the total value of purchases, and
similarly for country j's sales.
There are many ways that consumption and production flows could be allocated in
this matrix, and some models predict that each pair should be allocated according to the
gravity equation. We ask, is it possible to reject (3) in favor of some more likely model?
y'.y.Proposition 1: The simple gravity model Mij = :.r;:- satisfies the adding up
constraints..
Checking the constraints, we find that
Yilj Yj
LMij=L-=-LYi=lj,
. . Yw Yw .
1 1 1
and similarly for all columns. Note that there is no error term here. In the monopolistic
competition and complete specialization models the production structure pins down each
matrix element precisely. Similarly, with complete indifference about trading partners and
a random draw allocation the law of large numbers guarantees that the bilateral pattern
will converge on this equation exactly.
Proposition 2: The gravity model does not uniquely meet the adding up con-
straints.
Suppose bilateral trade is described by a more general model
M .. - 1 y{31 yl32 XI' e'I) - -. . .. I)'Y
w
1 ) I) (6)
where eij is a log-normal error term, uncorrelated with the regressors, f31 =fi 1, and/or
f32 =fi 1, and possibly f3i = f3j = O. We do not know what specific structural model would
generate this allocation, but we suppose that one exists. This model is a feasible allocation
if the matrix elements add up to the row and column totals, or
~Mij = :w ~~{31Y!2X~eij = Yj,
1 1
following conclusions unless there are extremely large differences across countries in value-added to gross output
ratios.
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and similarly for each row and column. For the f31 = f32 = 0, 'Y = 1 case, this amounts to a
restriction on the regressor matrix that [1]X = [1lX' = Y where Y is a vector of country
sizes and [1] is a vector of ones.9
There are an infinite number of X vectors that satisfy the adding up constraints
for any values of f31, f32 and 'Y chosen.10 In short, it is not inevitable that we will find
coefficients of one, nor even that these size variables will matter in the regression. Thus,
if we specify an alternative model including some variables X that add up in the right
way, it will be possible to generate a. test with some power relative to the hypothesis
that f31 = f32 = 1. Whether there exist any economically meaningful variables with this
particular property is another matter.
Proposition 3: If the bilateral allocation is given by
Mij =~o~oXijeij = Xijeij
estimating a simple gravity model on this data will result in pos-
itive income coefficients.
If we estimate the true model, the income coefficients will be zero. If we instead
estimate the simple gravity model given by equation (3), omitting the X vector we will find
positive coefficients due to omitted variables bias. This bias results in estimated coefficients
for each of the income variables given by
~- f3 ~ - cov(x,y)
- + 'Y xy - var(y)
where ~Xy is from the auxiliary regression of Xij on Yi. Using our assumptions that f3 = 0
and 'Y = 1, ~ = C::rX{, Given that Xij = Mij by assumption, can Yi and Xij be
uncorrelated? If so, then Yj and Mij must be uncorrelated. Writing out the covariance
formula
(7)
9 That is, for each row the adding up constraint is given by Xii +Xi2 +... +Xin =Yi and similarly for the column
constraints, Xli + X2i + ... + Xni =}i.
10 It is a simple matter to verify this numerically. This relationship will work for any X vector that is correlated




=n2 L.J(Yi -- Yi) L)Mij - Mij)
i j
where L Mij =Yi and L Mij =Yi
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1 ~ - -







we find that COV(Mij, Yi) > 0 and the estimated income coefficients will be positive. Since
(YiYj) and Xij must be correlated,·theincome·variableswill·slways·appear to matter when
estimating a simple gravity model naively, even when the coefficients in the true model
are zero. We know that a model given by equation (3) satisfies the adding-up constraints,
only another model with a similar distribution could also satisfy these constraints.
Proposition 4: Any bilateral allocation can be described by a "noisy" gravity
equation if the other determinants of that allocation are uncor-
related with country size.
First note that a "noisy" gravity model,
with Uij uncorrelated with the regressors, satisfies the adding up constraints. That is,
if and only if Yi and Uij are uncorrelated in every row and column. This seemingly
strong constraint, that the error must be uncorrelated with the included variables over
the entire sample and over 2n subsets of that sample, will always be met.11 Similarly, we
can expand the error by writing Uij = Xijeij. Here, Uij can be explained by observed
economic phenomenon, Xij, and a log-normal error term, eij, both uncorrelated with
11 To see this, note that Li YiUij =Yw for every row, and consider the uncorrelated case as a baseline. If Yi and
Uij are positively correlated for a single row, it will increase the left hand side of this expression. But since the
right hand side is equal for all 2n constraints, this can only be true if Yi and Uij are positively correlated for
all rows. This contradicts the initial assumption about Uij'
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country size. This also meets the adding up constraints.12 This tells us that any variable
can be incorporated into the "noisy" framework, so long as it is uncorrelated with country
size.
The claim in Proposition 4 is considerably stronger than this. To demonstrate,
suppose that an X vector - including perhaJ>s endowments, technology, trade barriers, and
the like - explains the entire bilateral allocation but that it is uncorrelated with country
size. Can this allocation, Mij =Xijeij, satisfy the adding up constraints, L:i Mij =Yj for
all rows and columns? No. The allocation meets the constraints ifand only if L:i Xij =Yj
for all i, j. This contradicts the assumption that Xij is uncorrelated with country size.
Compare this "noisy" version to the simple gravity model from Proposition 1. Both
models yield identical predictions for the coefficients on the country size variables but the
potential for error in the "noisy" version allows for two interesting differences. The first
difference is understanding the source of that error. For example, the probability model
requires that all buyers and sellers be exactly indifferent about their trading partners. It
is thus fundamentally incompatible with trade resistance and will not hold in the presence
of transport costs or tariffs. Proposition 4 says that we need none of the strong structure
in the monopolistic competition or probability models - any variable can be included in
the model and still satisfy the constraints, as long as it is uncorrelated with country size.
The second difference is that the "noisy" model tells us something about the po-
tential size of the error, or, equivalently, the amount of variation that variables other than
country size can explain.13 Divide the regressor matrix into the size variables, y~~? and
"noise" Uij or equivalently, Xijeij. What percentage of the total variation in bilateral
trade volumes can each explain? Interestingly, this depends on the variance in country
12 Writing out the constraints and using the zero correlation property, this model adds up as long as L:i Xij =1.
This constraint is easily met even if a particular variable (e.g., distance or tariffs) in the X vector has different
values for a particular row if we include row and column specific scaling.
13 In contrast, the probability model has no noise, and should fit the data perfectly. To verify this, we generate
y.y.
a ma.trix by assigning Yw "transactions" such that each matrix element i, j has probability~ of dra.wingYw
a particular dollar of trade. We then regress (log) bilateral trade volumes on (log) country sizes. Repeated
simulations demonstrate that as the number of transactions grows large, coefficients on the size variables and
the regression R 2 converge on one.
.~
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size - as var(Yi) rises, the fraction of variation explained by "noise" falls. This results from
the fact that bilateral import volumes are positively correlated with GNP. Increasing the
variability in GNP results in an increased variability in import volumes without altering
the variability of the "noise". This implies that as the variability in Yi increases, the re-
gression R 2 will increase. That is, the total ~um of squares increases while the error sum
of squares remains fixed; this implies that the regression sum of squares will account for a
larger fraction of the total.
To demonstrate this, we simulate tradefiow.data.in. a.matrixwith heterogeneous
country size. First, we generate elements in a matrix using draws from a uniform dis-
tribution. Each matrix element is equal in expected value, but has random variability.
Every row and column total is then equal in expected value, and therefore will not initially
add up to imposed country size constraints. We multiply each element in row i by ft so
that the row constraints are met. Since column constraints are not yet satisfied, we then
search for the minimum number of reallocations necessary in order to meet all adding up
constraints.14 Once the constraints are met, we regress (log) bilateral trade volumes on
(log) country sizes in the manner of a simple gravity model. We repeat the simulation,
using the same allocation algorithm and holding total matrix size constant, while varying
size heterogeneity.
Since the allocation model is identical in each case, our prediction is that the
size coefficients will be one in every regression, but that the fit of the regression will rise
with size heterogeneity. Both predictions are strongly borne out. Every regression yields
size coefficients insignificantly different from one. Figure 1 reports the R2 as a function
of heterogeneity, and shows that the fit rises from .02 to .88 as countries become more
dissimilar. That is, the "noisy" gravity equation is revealed in the data, but it explains a
range from almost none to almost all of the variation in bilateral trade. For comparison,
note that regressions on actual data reported in the introduction have an R2 = .66. In the
14 That is, the algorithm searches for elements i, j where the existing row i, column j totals exceed the constraints
and moves some of the value to elements k,1 where the existing row I, column k totals are short of the constraints.
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simulated data, samples with the same standard deviation of size dispersion generate an
R2 = .675. In short, the gravity equation explains almost precisely the same amount of
variation in simulated data as in real data.
The propositions of this section demonstrate the extreme generality of the gravity
equation when applied to a full bilateral matrix.15 Though the literature contains several
models that generate the gravity equation, we have dramatically generalized the set of
models consistent with it. Monopolistic competition, complete specialization, and proba-
bility models all require very strong struc~ure to generate thegravity equation precisely.
In contrast, proposition 4 shows that almost any model may be consistent with a "noisy"
gravity equation. Thus, stories that involve perfect or imperfect competition, relative en-
dowments or technology, and trade barriers of any sort will all generate trade patterns
consistent with the gravity equation so long as these variables are not strongly correlated
with country size. The ubiquity of the gravity equation stems not so much from the fact
that many models are able to predict it, but rather that the structure of bilateral matrices
force it to hold.
111.1 Measuring "International Trade"
With some exceptions, gravity equations are estimated on international trade data,
omitting home consumption. In this section, we extend our remarks on model generality
to this case, and also provide insights into correlates of trade volumes. First, recognize
that any bilateral allocation of flows will be governed by the above propositions, after an
appropriate re-scaling of the new row and column totals. As before, the product of the
new row and column totals need not describe the true allocation model, but the allocation
will necessarily be related to these variables.16
15 It is natural to ask whether subsets of the matrix behave similarly. A small country, choosing first, could
easily import more from small than from large countries without violating the aggregate adding up constraints.
Despite some effort to devise tests that utilize this fact, we are not hopeful that studying portions of the matrix
will yield useful information. If equilibrium trade relationships are solved simultaneously small countries cannot
choose first, and will then be bound, on average, by the constraints.
16 See Propositions 2 and 3.
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If we omit home consumption from the data, the resulting trade matrix has row and
column totals Mi' EXj, and sums over all values M w • A perfectly general representation
of these totals is17
(8)
The volume of imports depends on the total output of the country, and the dif-
ference between what it produces, '"'If and the average of world production, ).k, in each
sector. This is only an accounting identity and does not tell us that multilateral imports
and size will be related in equilibrium. Size may directly affect the allocation of production
(for reasons related to market scale), or because the cross-country distribution of tastes,
technology or endowments happens to be correlated with size.18 Trade will be a positive
function of size except in special cases where
for 8 ~ 1.
Propositions 4 then explains why the simple gravity model fits bilateral trade data.
Any allocation whose other determinants are not strongly correlated·with total imports
and exports must involve these variables adding up. Similarly, Propositions 2 and 3 tell
us that there may be a true model of the bilateral allocation Md = Xijeij that does not
involve total imports or exports, but that regressing bilateral trade volumes on M i and
EXj will yield positive coefficients. In short, bilateral trade will be well represented by a
gravity model because multilateral trade increases with size and the bilateral allocation
depends on the multilateral totals.
17 Define sectoral output shares as "Yf, so that output of a good k in country i is given by lik = "YfYi and
2:k "Yf = 1. Without loss of generality, assume identical and homothetic preferences in each country,so that
each country will consume a fraction Si = --Yi- of every consumption good, or its share in world income,
YworldCf = Si yk . An accounting identity gives the volume of imports as production less consumption, or
Mf ="YfYi - Si yk
k
Defining >.k as the share of good k in world consumption, >.k =~ and summing over all imported goods,
world
we arrive at equation INSERT HERE.
18 As an example, in a Heckscher-Ohlin world, allow a small country to expand by increasing all factor endowments
equi-proportionally. Production and consumption shares remain unchanged so the elasticity of trade with
respect to country size is one. If countries vary with respect to both size and factor endowments, the share of
trade in output depends on both.
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Next we examine the implications of our results for correlates of bilateral trade
volumes. First, what does the coefficient on country size this tell us? Suppose that the
trade share of output is a decreasing function of country size (larger countries are less
trade-dependent) so that Mi = ~/3 where f3 < 1. Here, country size is a perfect measure
of total imports so, if Proposition 4 holds, we will estimate a bilateral trade coefficient
f3 < 1. The coefficient interpretation seems straightforward - the trade share of income
is a diminishing function of income. However, an alternative interpretation of this same
coefficient is that trade shares are uncorrelated .with Yi, but our estimates .aresubject to .
attenuation bias.
To see this, suppose that bilateral trade is proportional to Mi and EXj as suggested
by Proposition 4, but that we estimate this relationship using the simple gravity model.
Here, Yi and Yj become proxy variables for total imports and exports. This errors in
measurement problem results in an estimated coefficient for the proxy variable of
.- f3f3= 2
1 + Ql
f3 is the coefficient on the multilateral imports variable, (f3 = 1 in the random allocation
model), Q* is the variance of (log) multilateral imports, a~ is the variance in the (log)
fraction of total output that is traded. Suppose that the variance in multilateral imports
is large relative to the variance in the fraction of output that is traded. Then, our estimates
for the proxy variable (country size) will closely approximate the estimates for the true
variable (total trade). The more heterogeneous is the sample with respect to the fraction of
output that is traded, the greater is this attenuation bias.19 So, even if the true elasticity
of trade with respect to output is one, the estimated 73 < 1. Worse yet, Proposition 2 and
3 tell us that the true model of bilateral allocation may not involve country size at all so
that its significance in the regression is an (unpredictable) function of omitted variables
bias.
19 This is one explanation for the Evenett and Keller (1997) result that the income coefficients fall systematically
as factor dissimilarity rises.
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Consider other variables that plausibly affect the trade share of output such as per
capita income, or the aggregate level of protection. These variables may affect bilateral
trade only to the extent that they affect the multilateral totals. That is, rich and open
countries trade a lot with specific bilateral partners, but only because they trade a lot
with everyone. Propositions 2-4 tell us that-,these variables will be significant in a bilateral
regression in much the same manner that country size is. Of course, these variables may
affect the bilateral allocation as well, and their estimated coefficients reflect both roles.
Using a gravity regression then gives us the abilityto say that bilateral trade volumes are
correlated with certain variables and little else. Unless we know the true model of trade,
we cannot know what estimated coefficients mean.
IV. What Can we Learn from Bilateral Trade?
The previous section makes clear why the gravity equation fits the data. Here we
explore the more interesting question - what does the gravity equation, or indeed any
analysis of bilateral trade, tell us about the data? We focus on three common uses of
the gravity equation: testing trade theory, norming bilateral trade flows, and examining
partial correlates of trade flows. In order to highlight the strengths and shortcomings of
the aggregate approach, we employ a multi-sector monopolistic competition model and
disaggregated trade data. We show that the basic notions of trade potential and trade
resistance translate exactly to the disaggregated case, but that the aggregate analog may
badly mismeasure them. More constructively, we show how techniques with disaggregated
data can avoid these problems and sort out why variables matter.
In the multi-sector model there are k = 1...K sectors, each monopolistically com-
petitive. The sub-utility function for each sector is aCES aggregator over varieties in that
sector, and total utility is an aggregation over sectors.




Bilateral imports in sector k depend on sectoral income and output shares. For good
k, denote Ct~ as i's income share, and Ij as j's output share. These shares will depend
in complicated ways on the form of the aggregate utility function, the distribution of
technology and endowments, relative prices, and trade barriers. Rather than solving for
shares endogenously in a specific model, we emphasize the manner in which cross-country
variation in shares will affect estimates, and how to control for them in certain cases.20
The volume of imports of a single variety depends on i's expenditure and relative
prices, just as in the one sector model.21 The intuition from the one sector model also
tells us that a sector expands output by increasing the number of varieties while holding
the output of each existing variety fixed.22 The number of varieties at j and the value of
bilateral imports is then a function of j's output of sector k. Summing over all varieties
at j
where
( k)-u(tk )1-uMI'. _ ~ ~y;y. Pj ij
aJ - Cta IJ a J p.k '
a
(9)
Pik =L 'YtYi(p~)-U (t~ )1-u.
I
As in the one sector model, the role of trade potential and trade resistance is clear. Trade
potential depends on the importer's expenditures and exporter's output of the good. Trade
resistance is a function of differences in relative landed prices.
20 The reason for this is two-fold. One, all of the points below follow, regardless of how the shares are determined.
Two, a complete solution of the model for multiple sectors can be exceptionally complicated. See Bergstrand
(1989).
21 See appendix for details. The only difference is that in the one sector model, total expenditure on the good is
simply Yj.
22 The simple relation of varieties to sectoral output is a product of strong symmetry assumptions (identical fixed
costs of entry for all varieties). A more general model with varying costs of entry would imply a different
relationship. However, we follow the intuition of the one sector result so that we can focus on the problems that
result purely from aggregation. A failure of the variety - output relationship is a general critique that applies
no matter the number of sectors.
IV.! Testing Trade Theory
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For reasons demonstrated in the previous section, using aggregate data to examine
the correlation between trade volumes and trade potential (country size) provides no in-
formation that can be used to select models. Harrigan (1993) applies a closely related test
to sectoral data and finds strong support for complete specialization models. However, the
same critique may also apply to disaggregated data. Rather than pursuing an analysis of
trade volumes, we begin by examining the presence or absence of trade. The strong CES
structure results in a fundamental prediction common to the aggregate and disaggregate
versions of the model. Assuming finite transport costs, the one sector model predicts that
all country pairs will exhibit positive trade. In the multi-sector model, all country pairs
will exhibit trade in every sector where the importer consumes the good, and the exporter
produces it. We begin our analysis by checking these basic predictions. This will provide
direct evidence on the model while also providing information about partial correlates of
trade and bilateral trade norms.
For 1992, we have data on 114 countries and 12882 country pairs. In Table 1, we list
a set of these countries, ranked by their total volume of imports. Cohl~n (1) presents the
number of partners with which each importer has a zero aggregate trade volume. Summing
over all countries, 42.5 percent of the pairs have no trade. Large countries import from
virtually all potential exporters, while smaller countries import from a substantially smaller
set of partners.
This trade is "missing" relative to the one sector model's prediction that all pairs
will have positive trade. However, if the zero observations all correspond to exporters
who are small and very distant from the importers; the model predicts that their trade
should be close to zero. To gauge the importance of the zeros, we estimate the one sector
model with an augmented gravity equation, pooling over all country pairs i~ our data.23
Using the estimated coefficients we predict the value of trade for all country pairs, and
23 The included varia.bles and coefficient estimates are presented in column (1) of Table 2.
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Table 1
Evidence on Missing Trade: Values and Volumes
Fraction of Zero Observations3
Aggregate Missing All Goods Imported Goods
Country1 Zeros Trade2 All 0-4 5-9 All 0-4 5-9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA 0 0 45 60 35 28 49 14
Germany 1 0 42 52 35 25 40 16
Japan 2 0 48 61 41 33 50 21
UK 1 0 42 54 35 27 43 17
France 2 0 44 55
..
38 27 42 16
Italy 2 0 45 57 38 28 44 17
Canada 11 1 53 69 43 38 60 24
China 18 9 62 79 51 48 70 34
Korea 11 1 55 70 45 40 . 61 26
Mexico 16 2 61 78 50 48 71 33
Sweden 8 1 52 67 43 36 56 23
Thailand 12 2 58 76 47 42 65 29
Australia 26 13 54 74 42 39 65 22
Saudi Arabia 62 399 57 75 45 48 67 37
Brazil 29 25 64 80 53 51 73 38
Israel 52 365 60 77 49 45 67 31
Argentina 39 49 64 82 52 50 74 35
Greece 19 3 57 72 48 43 62 30
India 22 10 66 84 55 51 75 39
Venezuela 46 22 65 82 55 53 74 40
Egypt 35 20 67 85 56 53 76 41
New Zealand 33 21 63 82 51 48 73 34
Peru 68 108 73 87 64 64 79 56
Bangladesh 57 169 89 96 85 84 93 80
Uruguay 59 55 76 91 66 65 84 55
Honduras 62 35 84 93 78 75 87 70
Zimbabwe 48 49 82 96 74 72 91 64
Ethiopia 74 494 83 95 76 72 86 67
Sudan 78 1161 85 95 79 75 88 70
Nicaragua 67 52 86 94 81 7.8 88 73
Nepal 85 627 89 97 84 81 93 76
Uganda 79 1450 88 97 82 77 88 74
Source: Calculations bl the author based on data from the NBER World Trade Flows CD.
See Feenstra et a ., 1997.
I The sample of countries is ordered by 1992 import volumes.
L: M"2 jEMij=O '1
The elements of this column are calculated as: MT = L: ....
M··
_ jEMij<>O '1
Mij is from the regression presented in column I of Table 2.
3The fraction of zero observations is calculated separately for each 4 digit SITC industry and then
averaged across all industries in the relevant group:
All industries, SITC I-digit industries (0-4) and (5-9).
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report the missing trade ratio for each importer in column (2). The ratio's numerator sums
over predicted values for country pairs with zero reported trade; the denominator sums
predicted trade for. pairs with positive reported trade.
The first six countries in the table have essentially no missing trade; while the
missing trade rises for smaller and poorer countries.24 Summing the predicted values of
missing and non-missing trade over all importers, missing trade amounts to only about
0.3 percent of total trade. In other words, the model predicts that these observations
should be close to zero and they are. We next look to sector level data to see if the model's
prediction about zero trade is as strongly supported. In columns 3-5 of Table 1, we present




We calculate MISSf separately for each importer and four-digit SITC commodity. This
number is the fraction of world exports in a four-digit SITC industry represented by
exporters that a given importer does not trade with. A value of zero means that the
importer purchases from every exporter in that sector - no trade is missing. A value of 50
percent means the importer does not purchase from countries representing half of world
exports in that industry. The simple differentiated goods story with identical preferences
predicts that we should observe a value of zero for every country and every industry.
For ease of display, we average MISSf over all commodities for a given importer
and report them in the column (3) of Table 1. Columns (4) and (5) break this number
out for SITC categories 0-4 (commodities) and 5-9 (manufactures). There are three basic
messages from this table. One, there are a very substantial number of zeros, even for large
and well-developed countries. Two, the incidence of missing trade is larger for smaller and
poorer countries. Three, far more trade is missing in the 0-4 commodity classification.25
24 These are, arguably, not the countries the model is designed to explain.
25 We have also calculated averages of MISS: at the one digit and two-digit SITe level; the incidence of zeros
declines significantly with each level of aggregation. However, manufactures are characterized by less missing
trade at each level of aggregation.
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Why is so much trade missing? Consider three explanations. The simplest is that
countries do not demand every variety in the way suggested by CES utility functions.
Second, individuals may purchase every variety of consumption good, but a large fraction
of imports are intennediate goods. To the extent that final goods production differs across
countries, we expect import demands to differ as well. Third, if there are fixed costs of
transport, consumers with CES preferences will buy only a subset of available varieties.26
In columns 6-8 of Table 1, we examine the hypothesis that trade is missing because
of cross-country differences in what is .imported.. ,We. ask:. conditional on a- country import-
ing a product from any source, does it import from every source? We re:-calculate the index
omitting 4-digit categories for which the country has no imports from any source. We find
three interesting things. First, for most countries the amount of missing trade declines
substantially. In other words, much of the missing trade we found earlier was because the
country in question did not import the good at all. This is consistent with an intermediate
goods trade explanation. Second, the amount of the decrease is greater for large countries
- conditional on buying the good from someone, large countries tend to buy from a larger
fraction of exporters. This is consistent with a story of fixed costs in transport. Third,
the decrease was greater for industries 5-9 than for industries 0-4. This suggests that the
"love of variety" intuition of CES utility functions describes manufactured goods to a much
greater extent than commodity categories.
The clear message of Table 1 is that a large amount of trade is missing relative to
a baseline model of monopolistic competition and identical preferences. This is damaging
to the very strong form of the model, but the tenor of the results still accords well with
its basic intuition. After allowing for differences in consumption vectors, perhaps due to
intermediate goods purchases, we see less missing trade. The variety story looks better in
the manufactured sectors than among commodity sectors, and better among rich countries
than among poor - precisely as one might think. And, even the missing varieties can be
26 See Romer (1994) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1996).
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explained with the simple expedient of fixed costs of transport. These results suggest a
rich set of issues to be explored in the cross-country, cross-commodity variation in these
zero observations. We leave this to future research while noting that none of these patterns
can be informatively addressed using aggregate trade data.
IV.2 Norming Bilateral Trade
With a sound theoretical justification for the gravity equation in hand, researchers
have used the model as a benchmark norm of bilateral trade. Equation (3) tells us not
only what trade is in the frictionless case, but what trade should be. That is, with a
precise description of trade potential in hand, deviations from that norm have direct and
quantifiable welfare consequences. We ask, under what circumstances is the aggregate
gravity model a precise description of trade potential?
With multiple sectors, the answer to this question depends on the aggregation
properties of the model. Beginning with equation 9 set all relative prices equal to 1, and
let the transport cost, tfj = 1 so that
(10)
Aggregating (10) over all sectors k, we have:
While similar to the simple aggregate gravity equation, an accurate measure of
trade potential is potentially confounded by differences in consumption and production
patterns across countries. In short, a country pair may exhibit less trade than the simple
aggregate model predicts because of trade barriers, or because the importer does not
consume what the exporter produces.27 Deardorff (1995) shows in the frictionless case that
k k
27 Recalling Proposition 4, if the OJ'''' /w term is uncorrelated with incomes it appears in the aggregate as noise.
Yw
If the term is correlated with incomes, then the income variables will be measured with omitted variables bias.
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if consumption and production shares are uncorrelated the multi-sector model aggregates
properly. A sufficient condition for this is that either sectoral consumption or production
shares are identical across countries. Thus, if we maintain the standard trade assumption
that consumption shares are identical across countries, an aggregate gravity regression is
a precise description of trade potential. Unfortunately, the analysis of "missing" trade in
the previous section strongly rejects this assumption.28
Consider the implications for two prominent uses of gravity equations: McCallum
(1995) and Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995).29 McCallum estimates the effect of the US-
Canadian border on trade flows between US states and Canadian provinces. He finds that
there is much less trade between a US-Canada pair than between a Canada-Canada pair
of similar sizes and distance. In the one sector monopolistic competition model, the only
reason to prefer home varieties is that the border raises the relative cost of foreign goods,
and consumers substitute away from these varieties. In this context, the suprisingly large
size of the border effect has two possible interpretations: either the border is a very costly
barrier to trade, or goods are sufficiently close substitutes that even a small barrier sharply
reduces trade.
In a multi-sector model, another interpretation is possible. For a variety of reasons
- the distribution of endowments and technology, or past barriers to trade - Canadian
provinces produce sets of goods that more closely match Canadian consumption than
do states in the US. If we examine disaggregated trade patterns while controlling for
sectoral consumption and production shares we would find little border effect. However,
if we examine aggregate trade patterns using GDP to wrongly proxy for consumption and
production shares, we will find a large border effect even if the cost of moving goods across
the border is negligible.
Similarly, Frankel, Stein, and Wei use sets of dummies to capture the degree to
which internal versus external trade is affected by customs unions. Suppose a customs
28 It is immaterial to the following analysis if the reason for that rejection is non-identical consumption preferences,
or trade in intermediate goods.
29 See also Wei (1996) who uses the gravity equation to assess the extent of "home bias" in consumption.
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union takes effect, but does not change the pattern of consumption or production. Then,
a tariff variable in an aggregate regression will appropriately capture the substitution
effects of customs union formation. However, the customs union may also result in a re-
arrangement of production that alters the correlation in the of and -yj terms. It will appear
that tariffs have an exceptionally strong effect on trade patterns, because they combine a
production reallocation and a substitution effect.
This is troubling for three reasons. First, as with McCallum, the aggregate re-
gression may only be capturing correlations in the consumption and production shares.
We can not say for certain whether this correlation is a result of the trade agreement, or
if it existed prior to the formation of the bloc.30 Second, if the trading bloc does cause
a re-allocation of production, the welfare implications are much different than if only a
substitution effect occurs.31 Third, a reduction in trade costs need not have the same ef-
fect on the production reallocation and substitution margins, resulting in deeply puzzling
conclusions about trade patterns.32
IV.3 Understanding partial correlates of trade
The basic model in Section 2 provides an attractive structure onto which one can
append explanations for trade to suit one's taste. Many studies appeal to the tij term as
a kind of catch-all for any variable that affects trade costs: distance, common borders and
language, exchange rate variability, customs unions, and so on. Or, more rigorously, one
can include factor endowments, per capita income, and population to help determine trade
potential in a multi-sector context, and then aggregate up for estimation.33 The exercise
30 This problem can be addressed by estimating that aggregate equation with panel data, as in Bayoumi and
Eichengreen,1995.
31 Our analysis of "missing" trade also indicates the possibility of a third margin with its own unique welfare
implications. \Vith fixed costs of transport, trade blocs may affect the number of varieties actually imported.
32 In other work we present evidence that precisely this sort of two-margin problem exists. Direct evidence
from freight data indicates that the marginal costs of distance are falling over time, yet estimates of gravity
regressions on aggregate data show that distance is becoming more important and not less. The reason is that
the production and consumption vectors of neighboring countries are becoming more highly correlated over
time. After controlling for sectoral variation in production and consumption, trade regressions reflect the facts
on freight: distance matters less over time
33 See Bergstrand (1985, 1989).
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here is usually not intended to be a rigorous structural test of a generalized monopolistic
competition model, but rather, to provide a framework for partial correlation analysis that
is consistent with known properties of gravity models.34
Of course, such studies are subject to precisely the same criticism just levied: ag-
gregate estimates of trade barrier effects will be mismeasured if these barriers are correlated
with production and consumption shares. Worse yet, there are several margins on which
barriers may operate, and aggregate data cannot be informative on this point. In this
section, we use disaggregated trade data to explore two margins - does a country pair .
trade in a sector, and conditional on positive trade, what is the volume of that trade?
Studying the volume of trade without worrying about the selection of trading part-
ners can create selection bias in our estimates. If the trade/don't trade margin is influenced
by the variables that influence the volume of trade, failure to account for selection will bias
our estimates. Table 2 provides insights into this bias. Column (1) is an augmented aggre-
gate gravity regression, provided for reference. In the remaining columns, the independent
variables remain the same, but the dependent variable is now bilateral imports measured
at the 4 digit SITC leve1.35 Column (2) reports results from a standard OLS regression
that ignores selection. Per capita incomes are insignificant, but the signs on the other
variables match the aggregate data. Note that the estimated coefficients on the income
variables are substantially less than one. This is because using GDP badly proxies for
consumption and output shares.36
We know that there are a large number of zero observations in the sectoral bilateral
trade data. Column (3) estimates a probit where the dependent variable takes on a value
of 1 if there is trade between a pair in that sector, and 0 otherwise. Again, all variables are
significant and of the same sign as the aggregate regression indicating that these variables
all affect the selection margin. To deal with the bias that selection creates we re-estimate
34 We thank Jeff Bergstrand for pointing this out to us.
35 As there are over 700,000 potential observations, we limit our analysis to a random subset of observations.
36 The next specification corrects this by using country by industry dummy variables to control for these shares.




(Standard errors in parentheses.)
Disaggregated Regression Results1
Explanatory Agg. Coefficient Estimates Beta Coefficients
Variable OL8 OL8 Probit Heckit OL8 Probit Heckit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Importer Income 0.836 0.374 0.027 0.732 0.353 0.172 0.692
(0.013) (0.008) (0.000) (0.019)
Exporter Income 1.025 0.408 0.048 1.053 0.299 0.287 0.771
(0.013) (0.009) (0.000) (0.031)
GDP/Pop - Imp 0.098 -0.011 -0.006 -0.079 -0.008 -0.028 -0.053
(0.017) (0.012) (0.001) (0.016)
GDP/Pop - Exp 0.082 -0.013 -0.007 -0.106 -0.007 -0.031 -0.062
(0.017) (0.012) (0.001) (0.017)
Distance -1.174 -0.585 -0.062 -1.341 -0.232 -0.121 -0.532
(0.036) (0.018) (0.001) (0.039)
Common Lang. 0.899 0.189 0.066 1.069 0.028 0.056 0.158
(0.071) (0.040) (0.002) (0.064)
Common Border 0.437 0.462 0.027 0.425 0.051 0.011 0.047
(0.163) (0.061) (0.004) (0.073)
R2 (Psuedo) 0.671 0.246 0.539 0.261
# of observations 7402 24,301 153,950 24,301
The data used in the regressions are from the NBER World Trade CD and the World Bank CD and
Jon Haveman's public international trade resources: http://intrepid.mgmt.purdue.edu/Trade.html.
lThe dependent variable in each regression is related to the bilateral trade of a particular commodity.
Probit: Y = 1 if there is positive trade. OLS & Heckit: Y = the bilateral value of imports into i from j, M i1
the effect of bilateral trade volumes, while using the Heckman (1979) correction. In column
(4), we find that the OL8 coefficients are heavily biased by the partner selection mechanism.
In fact, when this bias is accounted for, the coefficients return to levels that are startlingly
close to those reported on the second page of this paper and in the first column of Table
2.
Clearly both margins matter. To better understand how much they matter, we
27 August 1997
"
present beta coefficients for each regressor in each of the three regressions. A beta coef-
ficient is a measure of the impact of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory
variable .on the dependent variable.37 Comparing the Beta coefficients between the pro-
bit and second stage Heckit regression, we learn that the influence on trade volume is
roughly three times larger than on the trade/don't trade decision. Interestingly, there is
, .
considerable variation across variables in the importance of the correction. In the case of
the income variables, the OLS regressions indicate a more significant influence of importer
income while the Heckit suggests that exporter income plays a larger role. More dramatic.
is the reversal for the border and language variables. Note that while the coefficients on
the income and distance variables are similar to those found in the aggregate regression,
column 1, the relative magnitudes of the border and language coefficients are reversed in
columns 2 and 4. Finally, the Beta coefficients from the OLS regression are comparable in
size to the probit Betas; they are thus a dramatic understatement of their true influence
on trade volume.
V. Beyond the Gravity Equation
The message for aggregate data is grim. Simple one-sector models provide an
elegant rationale for the use of aggregate bilateral trade regressions in testing theory,
norming trade flows, and examining the partial correlates of trade volume. Unfortunately,
the set of models that generate the gravity prediction should be regarded as exceptionally
broad. If large countries trade more than small countries, the gravity model will generally
fit the data. Hope for matching theory to data then lies with a disaggregated approch
- our sectoral data shows patterns consistent with the rough intuition of monopolistic
competition models.
Any exercise in norming trade flows must necessarily rely on a theoretically sound
notion of normal trade. Our evidence suggests that such norming on aggregate data is not
37 This is calculated for the probit by first expressing the coefficients in terms of their marginal impacts on the
probability of positive bilateral trade.
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sensible. First, the data do not point to anyone theory as a likely source of bilateral trade
patterns. Even if aggregate bilateral patterns look exactly like the simple gravity equation,
deviations from the baseline mean different things in different models. Second, cross-
country differences in consumption and production vectors mimic trade barriers relative to
an aggregate baseline. Third, included variables operate on trade volumes through several
margins, each of which has different welfare implications. This point is also relevant if
we employ aggregate gravity equations to do little more than sort out partial correlates
of trade. We cannot tell from the aggregate data which margin is relevant, and it may
be possible that certain variables work in opposite directions on different margins. Again,
sectoral data provides promise on each point.
Gravity models have played a vital role in sorting out crude patterns in trade
data, uncovering, among other things, surprisingly large effects from borders and distance.
However, in order to truly understand the crucial questions layed out in the introduction,
it is time to go beyond the gravity equation to develop more careful, and ultimately more
useful, disaggregated techniques.
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APPENDIX A




9=~-1. and a is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Demand for a single variety
at location j
(ti .py-u
m" - Y; ))
I) - 1 p.1-u
I
where the Pi is an index of prices at country i given by
Pi = (L(tiiPi )l-u) l':a.
i
On the production side, there are four major equations, expressing the production
technology, the price of the good as a markup over marginal cost, the quantity of each
variety, and the number of varieties.
(production technology) (A.l)
(number of varieties) (AA)
(quantity of each variety) (A.3)
(markup over marginal cost) (A.2)
(demand all varieties) (A.5 )
Pi =O-l(bWj)
a 0
Xj = b1- 0
L·
nj = a(l ~ 0)
To arrive at the total volume of imports between two countries, note that all
varieties in a country will have the same price and face the same vect<;>r of bilateral trade
costs. This gives us the import demand over all varieties nj as
(tijPj )l-u





Pt = (I: nj(tijpj )1-u)Ib. (new price index) (A.6)
j
We can substitute in for the prices and for the number of varieties in each location
j to give
rearrange and note that Yj = WjLj and we get
W -U(t )1-uM .. - kY;Y. j ij. ,
aJ - a J p.. l-u
a
where k is a constant full of technology and substitution parameters. Alternatively, we
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